Ajtai recently found a random class of lattices of integer points for which he could prove the following worst-case/average-case equivalence result: If there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which nds a short vector in a random lattice from the class, then there is also a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which solves several problems related to the shortest lattice vector problem (SVP) in any n-dimensional lattice. Ajtai and Dwork then designed a public-key cryptosystem which is provably secure unless the worst case of a version of the SVP can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time. However, their cryptosystem su ers from massive data expansion because it encrypts data bit-by-bit. Here we present a public-key cryptosystem based on similar ideas, but with much less data expansion.
Introduction
Since the origin of the idea of public-key cryptography, there have been many public-key techniques described in the literature. The security of essentially all of these depends on certain widely believed but unproven mathematical hypotheses. For example, the well-known RSA public-key cryptosystem relies on the hypothesis that it is di cult to factor a large integer n which is known to be a product of two large primes. This hypothesis has been extensively studied, but there is still no proof that for a typical such n, the prime factors cannot be found in less than k steps, where k is a very large number. From a computational complexity point of view, we generate a speci c instance of a problem in NP (together with a solution, which is kept secret) and we rely on the belief that the problem is di cult to solve.
Apart from the lack of proof that any of these problems is really hard, i.e., there exists no e cient algorithm that will solve the problem in all cases, there is another serious issue. The mathematical hypothesis that these problems are di cult to solve really means di cult to solve in the worst case, but the security of the cryptographic algorithms depends more on the di culty of the average case. For example, even if one day factoring is proved to be unsolvable in probabilistic polynomial time, to the users of the RSA system, there is no guarantee that the key they are actually using is hard to factor. To use these protocols, one must be able to generate speci c instances of the problem which should be hard to solve. But typically there is no way to just generate known hard instances. One way to do this is to generate random instances of the problem, and hope that such instances are as hard on the average as in the worst case. However this property is known to be not true for a number of NP-hard problems.
Recently Ajtai 1] proved that certain lattice problems related to SVP have essentially the same average case and worst case complexity, and both are conjectured to be extremely hard. This development raises the possibility of public-key cryptosystems which will have a new level of security. Already Ajtai and Dwork 3] have proposed a public-key cryptosystem which has a provable worst-case/average-case equivalence. Speci cally, the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is secure unless the worst case of a certain lattice problem can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time.
Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi 11] have also given a public-key cryptosystem which depends on similar lattice problems related to SVP as in 1]. Unlike the work of 3], however, their method uses a trapdoor one-way function and also lacks a proof of worst-case/averagecase equivalence.
The cryptosystems of 3] are unfortunately far from being practical. All of them encrypt messages bit-by-bit and involve massive data expansion: the encryption will be at least a hundred times as long as the message. 1 In this paper we propose a public-key cryptosystem, based on the ideas of 1] and 3], which has much less data expansion. Messages are encrypted in blocks instead of bit-by-bit. We o er some statistical analysis of our cryptosystem. We also analyze several attacks on the system and show that the system is secure against these attacks. Whether there is a provable worst-case/average-case equivalence for this system is open. 1 In a private communication, Ajtai has informed us that this data expansion problem is being addressed by the authors of 3] as well. 1 2 Lattice problems with worst-case/average-case equivalence Here we brie y de ne the terms for lattice problems, and describe the results of Ajtai 1] and some improvements.
Notation. R is the eld of real numbers, Z is the ring of integers, R n is the space of n-dimensional real vectors a = ha 1 ; : : : ; a n i with the usual dot product a b and Euclidean norm or length kak = (a a) 1=2 . Z n is the set of vectors in R n with integer coordinates, Z + is the positive integers and Z q is the ring of integers modulo q.
De nition. If A = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g is a set of linearly independent vectors in R n , then we say that the set of vectors f P n i=1 k i a i : k 1 ; : : : ; k n 2 Zg is a lattice in R n . We will denote the lattice by L(A) or L(a 1 ; : : : ; a n ). We call A a basis of the lattice. We say that a set in R n is an n-dimensional lattice if there is a basis V of n linearly independent vectors such that L = L(V ). If A = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g is a set of vectors in a lattice L, then we de ne the length of the set A by max n i=1 ka i k. 1 (L) = min 06 =v2L jjvjj.
A fundamental theorem of Minkowski is the following:
Theorem 2.1 (Minkowski) There is a universal constant , such that for any lattice L of dimension n, 9v 2 L, v 6 = 0, such that jjvjj p n det(L) 1=n :
The determinant det(L) of a lattice is the volume of the n-dimensional fundamental parallelepiped, and the absolute constant is known as Hermite's constant. Minkowski's theorem is a pure existence type theorem; it o ers no clue as to how to nd a short or shortest non-zero vector in a high dimensional lattice. To nd the shortest non-zero vector in an n-dimensional lattice, given in terms of a basis, is known as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). There are no known e cient algorithms for nding the shortest non-zero vector in the lattice. Nor are there e cient algorithms to nd an approximate short non-zero vector, or just to approximate its length, within any xed polynomial factor in its dimension n. This is still true even if the shortest non-zero vector v is unique in the sense that any other vector in the lattice whose length is at most n c kvk is parallel to v, where c is an absolute constant. In this case we say that v is unique up to a polynomial factor.
The best algorithm to date for nding a short vector in an arbitrary lattice in R n is the L 3 algorithm of A.K. Lenstra, H.W. Lenstra and L. Lov asz 14]. This algorithm nds in deterministic polynomial time a vector which di ers from the shortest one by at most a factor 2 (n?1)=2 . C.P. Schnorr 16] proved that the factor can be replaced by (1 + ) n for any xed > 0. However Schnorr's algorithm has a running time with 1= in the exponent.
Regarding computational complexity, Ajtai 2] proved that it is NP-hard to nd the shortest lattice vector in Euclidean norm, as well as approximating the shortest vector length up to a factor of 1 + 1 2 n k . In a forthcoming paper 6], Cai and Nerurkar improve the NP-hardness result of Ajtai 2] to show that the problem of approximating the shortest vector length up to a factor of 1 + 1 n " , for any " > 0, is also NP-hard. This improvement also works for 2 all l p -norms, for 1 p < 1. Prior to that, it was known that the shortest lattice vector problem is NP-hard for the l 1 -norm, and the nearest lattice vector problem is NP-hard under all l p -norms, p 1 12, 17] . Even nding an approximate solution to within any constant factor for the nearest vector problem for any l p -norm is NP-hard 4]. On the other hand, Lagarias, Lenstra and Schnorr 13] showed that the approximation problem (in l 2 -norm) within a factor of O(n) cannot be NP-hard, unless NP = coNP. Goldreich and Goldwasser showed that approximating the shortest lattice vector within a factor of O( p n= log n) is not NPhard assuming the polynomial time hierarchy does not collapse 9]. Cai showed that nding an n 1=4 -unique shortest lattice vector is not NP-hard unless the polynomial time hierarchy
What is most striking is a recent result of Ajtai 1] establishing the rst explicit connection between the worst-case and the average-case complexity of the problem of nding the shortest lattice vector or approximating its length. The connection factor in the Ajtai connection has been improved in 5]. Ajtai de ned a class of lattices in Z m so that if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which nds a short vector in a random lattice from the class with a probability of at least 1=n O(1) , then there is also a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which solves the following three lattice problems in every lattice in Z n with a probability exponentially close to 1:
(P1) Find the length of a shortest non-zero vector in an n-dimensional lattice, up to a polynomial factor.
(P2) Find the shortest non-zero vector in an n-dimensional lattice where the shortest vector is unique up to a polynomial factor.
(P3) Find a basis in an n-dimensional lattice whose length is the smallest possible, up to a polynomial factor.
The lattices in the random class are de ned modulo q (q is an integer depending only on n, as described below), that is, if two integer vectors are congruent modulo q then either both of them or neither of them belong to the lattice. More precisely, if = fu 1 ; : : : ; u m g is a given set of vectors in Z n q then the lattice ( ) is the set of all integer vectors hh 1 ; : : : ; h m i so that
For a xed n, m and q, the probability distribution over the random class is de ned by uniformly choosing a sequence of integer vectors hu 1 ; : : : ; u m i. The problem of nding a short vector in a lattice from the random class is a Diophantine problem. Questions of this type date back to Dirichlet's 1842 theorem on simultaneous Diophantine approximation. From this point of view the problem can be stated in the following way, which does not involve any explicit mention of lattices, as pointed out in 10].
(A1) Given n; m = c 1 n]; q = n c 2 ] and an n by m matrix M with entries in Z q , nd a non-zero vector x so that Mx 0 (mod q) and kxk < n. nd the unique shortest vector if it is an n 4+ -unique shortest vector.
A new cryptosystem
Here we present the design of a new cryptosystem, which is based on the di culty of nding or approximating SVP, even though no speci c lattices are de ned. The secret key in the new system is a vector u chosen with uniform distribution from the unit sphere S n?1 = fx j jjxjj = 1g, and a random permutation on m + 1 letters. By allowing an exponentially small round-o error, we may assume that the coordinates of u are rational numbers whose denominators are bounded by some very large integer, exponential in n. Let Thus decryption using u and involves an easy instance of a knapsack problem. As summarized in the article of Odlyzko 15] , essentially all suggestions for cryptosystems based on knapsack problems have been broken. Here, however, the easy knapsack problem appears to have no bearing on the security of the system, since it appears that one must rst search for the direction u.
The new cryptosystem has similarities with the third version of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem (see 3]), but in the new system m + 1 = O(n) bits of plaintext are encrypted to an n-dimensional ciphertext vector, instead of just one bit of plaintext.
We have not speci ed the distribution of the v i , aside from its inner product with u being superincreasing. The following distribution has a strong statistical indistinguishability from m + 1 independent uniform samples of the sphere. Let M be a large integer, say, M 2 n . How secure is this new cryptosystem? We do not have a proof of worst-case/average-case equivalence. We can discuss several ideas for attacks that do not seem to work. The following discussion will also explain some of the choices made in the design of the cryptosystem.
We will rst show that if we did not employ the random permutation , rather we publish as public key the unpermuted vectors v 0 ; : : : ; v m , then there is an attack based on linear programming that will break the system in polynomial time.
The attack works as follows: From the given vectors v 0 ; : : : ; v m we are assured that the following set of inequalities de nes a non-empty convex body containing the secret vector u.
v x + b Using linear programming to nd a feasible solution to this convex body, we can compute in polynomial time a vectorũ satisfying all the inequalities. Even thoughũ may not be equal to u, as along asũ satis es the above set of inequalities, it is as good as u itself to decrypt the message P m i=0 i v i + r. Hence, the permutation is essential to the security of the protocol.
Next, let's consider the addition of the random perturbation r. This is to guard against an attack based on linear algebra, which works as follows.
Assume the message w = P m i=0 i v (i) were sent without the perturbation vector r. Then this vector is in the linear span of fv (0) ; v (1) ; : : : ; v (m) g, which is most likely to be linearly independent, by the way these v i 's are chosen. Then one can solve for the m+1 < n coe cients x i in w = P m i=0 x i v (i) . These coe cients are unique by linear independence, thus x i = i , and we recover the plaintext. The addition of the random perturbation r renders this attack ine ective, since with with probability very near one, w = P m i=0 i v (i) +r is not in the linear span of fv (0) ; v (1) ; : : : ; v (m) g, which is of dimension at most m+1. (If r were truly uniformly random from the ball jjxjj b=2, then the probability that w belongs to the lower dimensional linear span is zero; if r is chosen with rational coordinates with exponentially large denominator, then this probability is exponentially small.) When the vector w is not in the linear span, to recover the coe cients i appears to be no easier than the well known nearest lattice vector problem, which is believed to be intractable. Since the integers N i are superincreasing, we can show that for all i < m?3 log n, Q i < Q m =n 3 .
In fact, let m 0 = m ? 3 log n, then we can inductively prove that Q m 0 +j > 2 j Q m 0 ?1 2 j Q i for all i < m 0 . Thus for each i < m 0 we have Q i < Q m =n 3 . We will say that these Q i are \unusually small" (compared to max Q j ). Of course one cannot compute the Q i 's since one is given only the permuted ordering by and u is secret.
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The attack begins with the selection of a random subset of n ? 1 vectors v i . If we get all n ? 1 vectors having an unusually small dot product with the secret vector u, then the normal vector perpendicular to all these n ? 1 vectors will be a good approximation to u. From this one can break the system. We show next that with non-trivial probability 1=n O(1) Thus one can try for a polynomial number of times, and with high probability one will nd such a set of n ? 1 vectors and break the system. This attack will not work if m = n=2.
Statistical analysis
It is clear from the discussion that the secret permutation as well as the random perturbation r are both necessary. With a secret permutation , however, an adversary may still attempt to nd or approximate the secret vector u. In this section, the random perturbation r does not play an essential role in the analysis; it is easier to discard r in the following analysis, which is essentially the same with r, although a little less clean. Thus we will carry out the following analysis with b = 0 and r = 0. We will use the uniform distribution U on sets such as the hemisphere S n?1 + , namely the Lebesgue measure on S n?1 + , and we will denote a random variable X uniform distributed on such as set S by X 2 U S. The following analysis is carried out using the exact Lebesgue measure. In the actual cryptographic protocols, this must be replaced by an exponentially close approximation on the set of rational points with exponentially large (polynomially bounded in binary length) denominators. The errors are exponentially small and thus insigni cant. For clarity of the presentation, we will state all results in terms of the the exact Lebesgue measure. We note in passing that E S n?1 (w u) 2 ] over the whole unit sphere S n?1 is 1=n as well, by symmetry h ! ?h. For i = n, it is (E h 2 ]) 2 = 1=n 2 . For i < n, by the symmetry x n ! ?x n , it can be seen that E x 2 i ] is the same if we were to evaluate this expectation on the uniform distribution on the whole unit sphere. But on the whole sphere this is the same as E S n?1 x 2 n ] = E S n?1 h 2 ]. This, however, by the symmetry h ! ?h, is the same again if we were to evaluate it back on the hemisphere S n?1 + . Hence ultimately E x 2 i ] = E h 2 ] = 1=n, and E x 2 i ]E y 2 i ] = 1=n 2 . It follows that E (w w 0 ) 2 ] = 1=n:
Finally for E (w w 0 )(w w 00 )], we expand the product ( P n i=1 x i y i )( P n j=1 x j z j ) = P n i=1 x 2 i y i z i + P 1 i6 =j n x i y i x j z j . For i 6 = j, at least one of them is not n, so that either E y i ] = 0 or E z j ] = 0, For the distribution F, we will show that the secret information u is not safe. In fact we claim that s m can be used to approximate the direction u. Consider 
